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Case Comment
Can Attorneys and Clients Conspire?
Farese v. Scherer, 342 F.3d 1223 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
A conspiracy is traditionally defined as "[a]n agreement between two or
more persons to commit an unlawful act."' The condition that two or more
persons be involved is known as the "plurality" requirement. In Farese v.
Scherer, the Eleventh Circuit held that an attorney acting within the scope
of representation cannot be counted as a conspirator for purposes of the
plurality requirement.' In other words, there can be no such thing as a
conspiracy between an attorney and her client. This Comment argues that
the Eleventh Circuit's limitation on attorney-client conspiracies is
illegitimate as a matter of statutory interpretation and ill advised as a matter
of policy. Part I sets out the facts of Farese. Part II argues that a categorical
rule against attorney-client conspiracies is misguided. Part III concludes.
I
In 2001, Thomas Farese filed suit against Harold Dude in federal
district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), clause 1, which imposes civil
liability for conspiracies to intimidate or injure parties or witnesses to
federal lawsuits. Farese alleged that Dude and Dude's attorneys intimidated
and harassed him in order to compel his withdrawal of a prior lawsuit
against Dude. The campaign of intimidation included personal threats and
frivolous lawsuits filed against members of Farese's family. The district
court dismissed Farese's claim, holding that he lacked standing and that he
had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Farese appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit. After concluding
that Farese had standing, the circuit court turned to what it described as "an
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (8th ed. 2004).
2. 342 F.3d 1223 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
3. Id. at 1226-27.
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issue of first impression in our circuit: whether attorneys operating within
the scope of their representation may be deemed conspirators in a § 1985
conspiracy. ' 4 Because of § 1985's plurality requirement, whether Farese's
suit could survive summary judgment would turn on whether the court
counted Dude's attorneys as conspirators; if not, the claim would have to be
dismissed.
After observing that few circuits had addressed the subject, the
Eleventh Circuit reasoned that subjecting an attorney-client conspiracy to
the prospect of liability might threaten the "'right of a litigant to
independent and zealous counsel.' 5 The court further noted that other
disciplinary mechanisms to punish attorney misconduct already exist.6
Given these considerations, it concluded that "as long as an attorney's
conduct falls within the scope of the representation of his client, such
conduct is immune from an allegation of a § 1985 conspiracy. ' '7
II
The Eleventh Circuit's decision to immunize attorney-client
conspiracies was ill considered. Section 1985 speaks categorically,
addressing conspiracies against "any party or witness in any court of the
United States.",8 The words evince no intention to exempt attorney-client
conspiracies, nor did the Eleventh Circuit claim otherwise. Indeed, the court
made no attempt to justify its decision with respect to the words of the
statute or the intent behind it. The court instead relied on policy grounds
alone, limiting the reach of one right (the right to be free from conspiracies
to intimidate or injure witnesses or parties to a lawsuit) in favor of another
(the right to effective legal representation) without any legislative guidance
about their relative importance. Tradeoffs between these sorts of
incommensurable values are precisely the kinds of decisions least suitable
for judicial resolution.
4. Id. at 1230.
5. Id. at 1231 (quoting Heffernan v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405, 413 (3d Cir. 1999)).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1232. At the time of publication, the only other circuit to have directly addressed the
issue presented in Farese was the Third Circuit, from whose opinion the Eleventh Circuit quoted
heavily. See Heffeman v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 1999). Other courts have addressed the
related but distinct issue of whether a corporation and its outside counsel can fulfill § 1985(2)'s
plurality requirement, but these cases involve considerations inapplicable to Farese. See, e.g.,
Travis v. Gary Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 921 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1990) (relying on the
intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine to find that a corporation and its outside counsel did not
conspire). For a description of the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine and an explanation of why it
does not apply to Farese's facts, see infra note 26.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (2000).
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By resting its decision on its own policy judgment rather than on the
statute's language, the court exceeded its judicial mandate. 9 It is
controversial whether courts should ever read equitable exceptions into
statutes, even when a literal reading would seem to generate an outcome at
odds with congressional intent.10 But even if equitable exceptions are
sometimes appropriate to effectuate legislative intent, nothing about § 1985
suggests that a concern for zealous advocacy crossed Congress's mind
while enacting it." Congress may one day decide that the attorney-client
relationship warrants an exception to federal conspiracy law. Until that
happens, judges are not free to limit the scope of federal law merely
because they decide it would be preferable for policy reasons.
12
Not only is shielding attorney-client conspiracies from liability
incompatible with the plain language of § 1985, but it is also bad policy.
Though the "right of a litigant to independent and zealous counsel" is
undoubtedly important, the Eleventh Circuit offered no reason to believe
that the prospect of § 1985 liability would chill effective advocacy. Good
faith lawyering is generally immune from liability, and "[c]ourts have been
reluctant to impose any professional liability where the lawyer deals at
arm's length with a client's antagonist ...within minimum bounds of
decency and orderly judicial process."' 13 If an attorney initiates a suit for
9. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 533 (1947) ("To go beyond [a statute's words] is to usurp a power which our democracy has
lodged in its elected legislature.").
10. Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 17 (1997) ("[lIt is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even
with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather
than by what the lawgiver promulgated."), with Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414,
439 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Where strict adherence to the literal language of the statute
would produce results that Congress would not have desired, this Court has interpreted other
statutes to authorize equitable exceptions though the plain language of the statute suggested a
contrary result.").
11. Cf Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 94 (1987) ("Petitioners are ... urging us to engraft an
equitable exception upon the plain terms of the statute. Even if we had the power to do so, the
equities petitioners invoke are not the equities the statute regards as predominant.").
12. See United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 74 n.7 (1994) ("Where the language of a
statute is clear, that language . . . should be followed."); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990) (refusing to create an equitable exception to a statute on policy
grounds); id. at 377 ("Understandably, there may be a natural distaste for the result we reach here.
The statute, however, is clear."). A court may interpret a statute contrary to its plain meaning
"[w]here the plain language of the statute would lead to patently absurd consequences that
Congress could not possibly have intended." Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,
470 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). However, this "narrow exception," id., applies only when Congress has made a
scrivener's error, not an error of judgment, see Robert J. Gregory, Overcoming Text in an Age of
Textualism: A Practitioner's Guide to Arguing Cases of Statutory Interpretation, 35 AKRON L.
REv. 451, 463-64 (2002) (describing the "'scrivener's error exception"' to the rule that courts
should enforce a statute's plain language).
13. ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 301:602 (2003); see id. at
301:602-03 (describing various scenarios in which courts have declined to impose liability for
lawyers' good faith advocacy); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 cmt. d (1977)
(maintaining that an attorney who "acts primarily for the purpose of aiding his client in obtaining
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good faith reasons-rather than to deter or injure a party or witness to a
suit-by its terms § 1985(2) does not apply. Courts have consistently held
that an alleged conspirator must act with the specific purpose of interfering
with trial rights to come within § 1985(2)'s ambit.14 Further protecting
zealous advocacy, courts have held that mere conclusory allegations of
wrongdoing do not suffice to establish liability.' 5 Where a plaintiff can
show deliberate, wrongful conduct by an attorney and her client, however,
§ 1985 should offer relief.
In other contexts, courts do not hesitate to hold lawyers accountable for
intentionally collusive, fraudulent, or abusive behavior.' 6 Indeed, attorney
misconduct gives rise to conspiracy liability in a variety of circumstances-
for instance, attorney-client conspiracies to commit health care fraud or to
obstruct justice.17 Yet the Eleventh Circuit's rule would shield an attorney
from § 1985(2) liability even for clearly unethical actions, as long as the
client's interests motivated his behavior.1 8 No reason exists to believe that
an attorney's accountability for intimidating or intentionally injuring parties
or witnesses to federal suits poses any greater risk to his client's rights than
conspiracy liability in other contexts. Zealous advocacy ceases to merit
protection when attorneys use their legal skills for improper purposes such
as interfering with the administration of justice. 19
a proper adjudication of his claim" rather than to harass or intimidate does not face liability even if
he knows the claim is unlikely to succeed).
14. See, e.g., Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Sav. Bank, 820 F.2d 754, 758 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that a
successful § 1985(2) plaintiff must connect the alleged conspiracy to a specific federal court
proceeding with which the defendant has intentionally interfered); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d
820, 840 (3d Cir. 1976) (same).
15. See, e.g., Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 1990)
(affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's § 1985(2) claim on summary judgment because it lacked
substantiation); Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs., 888 F.2d 1175, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting the
plaintiffs § 1985(2) claim for failure to show that "he was in fact hampered from testifying
'freely, fully, and truthfully"' (quoting § 1985(2))).
16. See, e.g., Aranson v. Schroeder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1027 (N.H. 1995) (creating "malicious
defense" liability for "counsel who engages in the fostering of an unfounded defense or pursues a
defense for an improper purpose"); Nineteen N.Y. Props. Ltd. P'ship v. Uk Jee Kim, 674
N.Y.S.2d 642 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that an attorney may be liable if he maliciously
pursues a baseless suit). See generally ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT, supra note 13, at 301:603-05 (describing misconduct, including abuse of process, for
which a lawyer may be held accountable to nonclients).
17. See, e.g., United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000) (reversing a lower
court's award of a new trial following the conviction of an attorney for conspiracy to commit
Medicare and Medicaid fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2)(A)); United
States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming the conviction of an attorney for
conspiracy to obstruct justice under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and § 1503).
18. See Farese, 342 F.3d at 1231 (holding that attorneys are immune from § 1985(2) liability
"even if the challenged activity violates the canons of ethics").
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 cmt. d (1977) (maintaining that if an
attorney files a frivolous suit "for an improper purpose .... he is subject to the same liability as
any other person"); Jonathan K. Van Patten & Robert E. Willard, The Limits of Advocacy:
A Proposal for the Tort of Malicious Defense in Civil Litigation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 891, 927
(1984) ("When the lawyer goes beyond the role of counselor and intentionally initiates defensive
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Furthermore, traditional safeguards remain available to ensure that good
faith advocacy is not chilled along with malicious behavior. For instance,
attorney-client privilege prevents a § 1985 plaintiff from gaining access to
an attorney's confidential statements unless the plaintiff presents evidence
to support a reasonable belief that the statements will establish attorney
misconduct and the court determines in camera that such misconduct has
occurred.20 And if an attorney is accused of participating in a conspiracy but
possesses privileged information that will exonerate him, ethics rules permit
him to disclose the privileged information for the purpose of clearing his
name. 21 Baseless accusations of attorney-client conspiracy are thus unlikely
to prevail, and immunizing such conspiracies is unnecessary to safeguard
lawful and vigorous advocacy.
After expressing its concerns over the potential chilling effects of
§ 1985 liability, the Eleventh Circuit went on to suggest that § 1985 liability
is unnecessary because "disciplinary structures are currently in place to
address any wrongful conduct by an attorney., 22 This second argument
undercuts the first one. If § 1985 does not provide significantly more
deterrence than existing structures, then it is also unlikely to chill zealous
advocacy. But if § 1985 meaningfully increases attorney liability, then
presumably it also deters. The relevant inquiry, however, is not merely
whether § 1985 liability provides additional deterrence, but also whether it
provides the right kind of deterrence. Section 1985 represents a legislative
judgment that access to federal courts deserves special protection above and
beyond the protection that comes from general prohibitions on intimidation
and threats. By holding to account attorneys whose abuses harm federal
rightsholders, extending § 1985 liability to lawyers provides precisely the
special safeguards for which the statute calls.
Beyond its deterrence value, § 1985 also allows conspiracy victims to
receive compensation for any damages they have suffered. Other remedies
for attorney wrongdoing do not necessarily include full compensation. For
instance, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 covers "excess costs, expenses, and attorneys'
action that harasses the plaintiff and that the attorney knows or should know is without a credible
basis, then the attorney, no less than the client, should be liable.").
20. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (holding that attorney-client
privilege "does not extend to communications made for the purpose of getting advice for the
commission of a fraud or crime" (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 574 (explaining that,
upon a party's claim that the crime-fraud exception applies, the court should conduct in camera
review to determine the exception's applicability); id. at 574-75 ("[B]efore a district court may
engage in in camera review at the request of the party opposing the privilege, that party must
present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that in camera review may yield
evidence that establishes the exception's applicability.").
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 83 (2000) ("The
attorney-client privilege does not apply to a communication that is relevant and reasonably
necessary for a lawyer to employ in a proceeding.., to defend the lawyer... against a charge by
any person that the lawyer ... acted wrongfully during the course of representing a client.").
22. Farese, 342 F.3d at 1231.
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fees reasonably incurred because of' vexatious litigation, but it does not
provide for general compensatory damages.23 The explicit purpose of Rule
11 sanctions is to deter, not to compensate, and Rule 11 sanctions are
typically paid to the court, not the opposing litigant.24 Suing under
§ 1985(2), clause 1 allows a victim of an attorney-client conspiracy to
recover full compensation for the harms suffered, including nonfinancial
harms.
Additionally, many other anti-frivolous-suit measures compensate only
the frivolous-suit defendant. Imagine that A is involved in a suit against B,
and B and his attorney threaten suit in another court against C, one of A's
witnesses, to keep C from testifying. A may not have a cause of action
against B--only C would.25 But A, not C, is the primary victim of the
conspiracy, because it is A's suit that suffers if C is too intimidated to
testify.
When, as in Farese, an attorney and his client conspire in a manner that
harms third parties, they should be held liable for their conduct as would
any other co-conspirators.26 Indeed, § 1985(2), clause 1, which protects
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. I1 (c)(2) (providing for "an order directing payment to the movant of some
or all of the reasonable attorneys'fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the
violation" but not providing for general compensatory damages (emphasis added)); id. ("A
sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition
of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated."); see id. advisory
committee's note ("Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to compensate,
the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as
a penalty.").
25. See, e.g., GRiD Sys. Corp. v. John Fluke Mfg. Co., 41 F.3d 1318, 1319 (9th Cir. 1994)
("[Section] 1927 limits a federal court's ability to sanction an attorney for conduct before another
court."); Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Case (In re Case), 937 F.2d 1014, 1023 (5th Cir. 1991)
("The language of § 1927 limits the court's sanction power to attorney's actions which multiply
the proceedings in the case before the court. Section 1927 does not reach conduct that cannot be
construed as part of the proceedings before the court issuing § 1927 sanctions."); Healy v.
Labgold, 271 F. Supp. 2d 303, 305 (D.D.C. 2003) ("While this court has inherent authority to
sanction misbehavior by litigants in matters before it, no one has ever suggested that this inherent
authority extends to misbehavior before another district court." (footnote omitted)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977) (providing that the party against whom a suit is
maliciously initiated may sue for "wrongful civil proceedings" but offering no remedy for other
aggrieved parties).
26. An exception to the general availability of conspiracy liability arises where the alleged
conspirators are members of the same corporate entity. Under traditional agency principles, the
actions of a corporation's agents are attributed to the corporation itself. As a result, when multiple
agents of the same corporation engage in an action, only one actor-the corporation-is involved,
and the plurality requirement cannot be met. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding intracorporate activity immune from conspiracy prosecution
under section 1 of the Sherman Act). This so-called "intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine" rests on
a notion of corporate personhood inapplicable to the attorney-client relationship. A corporation
cannot act except through its agents, whose deeds the law ascribes to the corporation, while an
attorney merely acts on her client's behalf. See Farese, 342 F.3d at 1230 n.8 ("Because Farese
alleges a conspiracy between Dude and his attorneys, this appeal does not implicate the
intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine."); Heffernan v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405, 413 (3d Cir. 1999)
("Although the case law on intracorporate conspiracies provides a convenient analogy for the
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parties and witnesses to federal lawsuits, is particularly suited to attorney-
client conspiracies, because the prospect of litigation may be used to
threaten parties against invoking their legal rights. Section 1985 was
originally enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 to deal with a
campaign of intimidation that prevented the evenhanded administration of
justice in the South.27 Congress's intent was to ensure that such intimidation
would not be allowed to interfere with access to justice in federal courts.
Intimidation has many incarnations, and today it may be more likely to take
the form of vexatious litigation than of physical violence.28 Farese itself
shows how the threat of frivolous suits can be used just like the threat of
violence to interfere with federal court proceedings: Farese alleged that
Dude and his attorneys "filed malicious and frivolous lawsuits against
members of Farese's family in order to (1) intimidate and threaten him and
his subpoenaed witnesses; (2) obstruct judicial proceedings; and (3) block
,,29his access to the courts. Whether violence or ruinous lawsuits are
threatened, § 1985(2), clause 1 should be available as a tool to protect the
integrity of federal court proceedings.3°
Denying federal protection against attorney-client conspiracies would
force victims of conspiracies against parties or witnesses to federal lawsuits
to seek remedy in state court3 '-assuming any such remedy were
available-while other conspiracy victims would retain the right to sue in
federal court. The 1871 Act grew out of concern that state courts in the
Reconstruction South were "unable or unwilling" to protect litigants and
witnesses from the Klan's conspiratorial machinations.32 Though today's
state courts are undoubtedly better equipped to combat misconduct,
attorney-client situation, there are important differences between the agency relationships
involved in private corporate activities and those arising in the practice of law.").
27. See Brian J. Gaj, Note, Section 1985(2) Clause One and Its Scope, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
756, 757-59 & nn.10-20 (1985).
28. See, e.g., Stephen Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions To Dismiss, and Other Examples
of Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1137 (1986) (observing
that, in the antitrust context, "[c]ountersuits and crossclaims ... are notoriously frivolous"); Note,
Counterclaim and Countersuit Harassment of Private Environmental Plaintiffs: The Problem, Its
Implications, and Proposed Solutions, 74 MICH. L. REv. 106, 107 (1975) (describing the use of
countersuits as "a new litigation strategy .... [d]esigned... to harass [environmental] plaintiffs
into compromising or withdrawing their suits").
29. Farese, 342 F.3d at 1226.
30. See McCord v. Bailey, 636 F.2d 606, 614 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Preserving the integrity
of the federal judicial process clearly includes discouraging all conspiracies ... that use threats,
force, or intimidation to deter free, full, and truthful testimony.").
31. See Farese, 342 F.3d at 1231 ("[A]n offended third party may ... proceed against the
offending attorney under state law or report the conduct to state disciplinary bodies.").
32. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 321 (1871) (statement of Rep. Stoughton) ("The
State authorities and local courts are unable or unwilling to check the evil or punish the
criminals."); see also id. at 321-22 (arguing that the Klan's system of "perjury and fraud" was
"ingeniously devised for the express purpose of enabling a few bad men ... to control the State
courts and local authorities"); id. at 653 (statement of Sen. Osborn) ("The State courts, mainly
under the influence of this oath [of Klansmen to pejure themselves in defense of fellow
members], are utterly powerless ....").
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situations still exist in which the preservation of a federal forum remains
beneficial. Imagine a litigant who sues in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction precisely because she suspects she is unlikely to get a fair shake
in state court-because she is an out-of-towner who fears favoritism toward
her local opponent, because her opponent or his lawyer has a close
relationship with the state judges, or for some other reason. Her opponent
and his lawyer threaten to file a frivolous claim against her in state court if
the federal suit is not dropped. Such a conspiracy victim would be reluctant
to proceed in state court, because fear of bias in state court is precisely what
led her to file suit in federal court in the first place.
Finally, by taking license with the plurality requirement, the Eleventh
Circuit created a tool that courts may later use to further scale back
conspiracy law. Once the plurality requirement is qualified by a
"compelling policy concerns" test, the qualification may be easily extended
by imaginative judges unsympathetic to conspiracy claims. It may only be a
matter of time before a different court decides that "compelling policy
concerns" justify expanding the ban on conspiracy liability to other
contexts, like the doctor-patient relationship. After all, isn't the right to
unfettered medical assistance just as important as the right to unfettered
legal assistance? Yet were the limitation on conspiracy liability thus
extended, it could potentially pose a significant obstacle to prosecutions for
conspiracy to commit medical or insurance fraud.33
III
In a unanimous opinion construing § 1985(2), clause 1, the Supreme
Court observed that "[p]rotection of the processes of the federal courts was
an essential component" of the 1871 Act.34 The protection of federal
witnesses and parties against intimidation and harassment remains an
important goal today. While the Eleventh Circuit's limitation on attorney-
client conspiracies may have been motivated by legitimate concerns, the
court overstepped the bounds of the statute and its role as interpreter. If any
limitation on the reach of conspiracy law is to be implemented, it should be
the product of legislative, not judicial, action.
-Allon Kedem
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (criminalizing conspiracies by "two or more persons" to
defraud the United States). Section 371 is routinely applied to medical and insurance fraud cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074 (7th Cir. 1992) (affiming the conviction of
defendants engaged in a conspiracy to commit fraud in violation of § 371, in a scheme in which
"patients" and their doctor submitted false medical reports); United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827
(3d Cir. 1978) (same).
34. Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 727 (1983).
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